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ABSTRACT This article considers the ethical guidelines concerning
autonomy, negotiated consent and transparency in relation to an ethnogra-
phy of psychiatry. It suggests that the complexities and unequal power distri-
bution of the psychiatric consultation make these guidelines difficult to apply.
Rather an attempt is made to develop an ethics of patient acknowledgement
even where this presents ethical misgivings vis-à-vis psychiatrists. I argue for
the importance of ethnography rather than the instantiation of abstract prin-
ciples to the development of an ethical perspective.
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He felt as though he had been sucked into a machine that was dismembering
him into impersonal, general components before the question of his guilt or
innocence came up at all. (Musil, 1997: 168)
Ethnographic encounters with patients and their psychiatrists bring ethical
dilemmas into painful focus. The title of my article was deliberately chosen
to reflect what I see as a central ethical problem in psychiatric practice.
Deception and distrust characterize the relationship between Latvians and
wider society and these qualities have inevitably come to shape the relation-
ship between patients and their psychiatrists. What Frank describes as ‘the
subversive voice’ of suffering is a protest against the ideological voice of
psychiatry (2001: 360).
The very rapid economic liberalization of the Baltic States and its prob-
lematic relationship with an unrealistic philosophy of limitless individual
opportunity has made deception harder to pin down but has intensified
distrust and isolated the subversive voice. The process of economic
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liberalization has scooped up psychiatric theory and practice. Earlier
somatic diagnoses have been replaced by psychological diagnoses.
Psychiatry, medicine and the social sciences have all been implicated in the
process of fragmenting and reconstructing individual experience to fit in
with what Smith calls their own specialist ‘textually mediated forms of
ruling’ (1993: 212). However, in most cases such processes are ongoing, and
patients and respondents have become habituated and embedded within
these discursive projects. Approval of medical or sociological texts is to be
understood not as authentic approval but as capitulation to relations of
ruling (Frank, 2001: 356). Following Bourdieu (2002), I would describe some
psychiatric interchanges as misrecognition and relate such misrecognition
to contradictions between the philosophy and implementation of liberal-
ism in Latvia and the consequences of such contradictions for individuals.
Ironically, however, this knowledge has only been made possible at a cost
of fudging issues to do with negotiated consent and transparency. In post-
Soviet Latvia we can witness western psychiatry in the process of trying to
articulate its discursive project and to establish relations of ruling. As a
result of the uncertain hegemony of a changing psychiatric discourse the
discordant voice of patients’ suffering is more apparent.
Latvia along with the two other Baltic States played a key role in accel-
erating the dismantling of the Soviet Union (Lieven, 1993). These countries
were keen to end their very real experience of Soviet oppression. At the
same time their new democratic leaders were ready to embark upon an
immediate and radical programme of economic reform.
Latvia through numerous governments has not strayed from this liberal
economic path. Its firm acceptance of the market and concomitant rejection of
state interventionism has placed Latvia among the top tier of the reforming
countries in the eyes of international financial organisations. (Pabriks and Purs,
2002: 95)
However, for many Balts these economic changes, involving as they did the
end of socialist support structures such as free health care, brought about
considerable personal hardship and insecurity. Political and economic liber-
alization affected every aspect of society including medicine and psychiatry
for which charges were introduced in 1995.
My thematic interests arise without exception from my need to acknowl-
edge the experience of individuals and to put on record my encounter with
them. That is not to say that I wish to exclude theory altogether. But the
task of anthropology as of philosophy ‘is to say whatever can be said that
is as general as the field permits’ (Toulmin, 1988: 348). My field, in this case,
focused on the dialogue between patients and their psychiatrists: an
exchange between narratives of despair and a discourse of diagnoses and
medication. Patient narratives included a polyphony of voices that spoke
of cramped accommodation, unemployment and poverty as well as of
shame and self-blame. Through listening to these consultations I became
health: 9(4)
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interested in three areas: first, in identifying the key features of change from
a Soviet and socialist society to a liberal capitalist one that impinge upon
lay conceptions of the self and narratives of distress; second, in understand-
ing how these shifts in culture have permeated the theories and treatment
strategies of mental health professionals; and, finally, in mapping the extent
to which understandings of lay people and mental health professionals
converge or diverge and how this contributes to personal suffering. All of
these questions have an ethical dimension. Radical economic and political
changes have brought with them a shift in the locus of deception, which has
resulted in guilt and shame for many. Under Soviet occupation the
mismatch between official versions of history and actual experience could
not be openly acknowledged but was keenly felt and easy to identify. The
collapse of Soviet power has brought with it a policy of economic liberal-
ism, which rests upon a conception of individual power that fits badly with
the reality of everyday life. However, the philosophy of agency has power-
fully penetrated individual psyches so that makes its mismatch with avail-
able opportunities harder to identify. Psychiatrists play an important role
in this process in that the language they use has a huge potential for affirm-
ing or diminishing self-worth and in shaping conceptions of the self. And
third, an increasing divergence between lay and professional understand-
ings undermines the project of finding meaning in illness.
These three concerns confronted my fieldwork throughout its entirety. It
seems to me that they raise ethical issues of a more fundamental nature than
those traditionally associated with anthropological research. They challenge
but also transcend issues to do with autonomy, informed consent and trans-
parency, both in relation to psychiatrists and in relation to their patients.
What kind of autonomy is being given to patients? Miller distinguishes four
different meanings of autonomy: namely, as freedom of action, as authen-
ticity, as effective deliberation and moral reflection (1981: 22). My encounter
with patients and psychiatrists suggests that there is a tension and contra-
diction between their conceptions of autonomy. Psychiatrists appear to be
concerned with nurturing a sense of autonomy to do with recognizing and
conforming to a particular kind of patient role. Patients’ concern with
autonomy is of a different order and relates to moral deliberation and
authenticity. This in turn raises the question of whether transparency within
the research relationship is of paramount importance or whether it can be
overridden in favour of making a long-term contribution to the well-being
of psychiatric patients? How can one negotiate the differences in ethical
position of a Soviet-grown psychiatry and British anthropology? To what
extent do institutional constraints and official ethical guidelines influence
the actual practice of psychiatrists? What are the ethical implications of
listening to the misery of others with a view to translating such misery into
an anthropological text? Frank writes of balancing on the edge between
symbolic violence and silence (2001: 361). And finally, in what ways has the
westernization of psychiatry altered the practice of psychiatry in Latvia and
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changed relations between doctors and their patients? The answers to these
questions lie not in ethical theory but in ethnographic contextualization. We
must look to areas that the early moral philosophers chose to ignore.
Toulmin writes: ‘In four sets of topics and spheres of thought, they were
especially uninterested: the “oral”, the “particular”, the “local”, and the
“timely”’ (1988: 338, emphasis in original). Toulmin argues that if ethics is
to have meaning it must embed itself in ethnographic and clinical context.
Others have argued that without ethnography ethics cannot survive:
Theoretical systematisation supposedly transubstantiates the water of moral
experience into the wine of moral knowledge. Although the ritual may continue
to play a role in the cathedral of academia, it remains peripheral to the outside
world. There moral experience retains its primacy, and it is appreciating the
primacy of experience and in providing ways of understanding and guiding that
experience that ethnography can be useful. (Hoffmaster, 1992: 1424)
Ethical questions are easier to formulate than to answer. My answers
indicate the beginnings of an argument and the tentative mapping out of a
moral domain. Autonomy, like freedom, has multiple meanings but essen-
tially they relate to two dimensions. They are the freedom to act and the
freedom to take up a moral position and to be a particular kind of person.
Taylor (1985) and Frankfort (1988) both argue that freedom in the latter
sense is more important: ‘Agents are beings for whom things matter, who
are subjects of significance’ (Taylor, 1985: 104). Thus what matters to the
patient must be recognized within the psychiatric consultation. Issues of
transparency raise the question of transparency for whom? Rendering the
research transparent to the psychiatrist might have made research imposs-
ible and thus ultimately have silenced the voice of the patient. And finally
with regard to translating the misery of others into an anthropological text,
my view is that, by and large, psychiatry carries greater risks of symbolic
violence and misrecognition than does a humanistic anthropology. In part
this is no doubt due to the greater institutional and financial backing of
psychiatry. Bourdieu puts this well:
The symbolic violence that any ideological discourse implies, in so far as it is
based on misrecognition, is only operative inasmuch as it is able to make its
addressees treat it the way it demands to be treated, namely with all due respect,
observing the proper formalities required by its formal properties. Ideological
production is all the more successful when it is able to put in the wrong anyone
who attempts to reduce it to its objective truth. (2002: 153)
Although the three Baltic States are cited as an economic success story,
this has been, as I have indicated, at considerable human cost for large
numbers of people. The problem for many middle-aged people is that they
have learnt to live life, to play the game, according to one set of rules and
that mid-way through their lives those rules have undergone a radical
change. Playing by the rules no longer brings them the rewards they were
promised. The result is a huge feeling of loss and wasted lives. Furthermore,
health: 9(4)
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the locus of responsibility for an individual’s well-being has shifted from
collective imaginings such as the state, history and destiny to the individual
agent. Nuckolls has made an interesting attempt to relate histrionic and anti-
social personality disorders to Weber’s ideal types configured around
moralism and materialism (1992: 37). These twin pillars of the capitalist self
exert an influence beyond specific psychiatric diagnoses and combine to
constrain individuals in a particularly painful grip, making them feel acutely
responsible and ashamed of a lack of material success. The dramatic changes
in conceptions of the self and responsibility remind us forcefully that the
self has a history (Bruner, 1986, 1990; Gergen and Gergen, 1986; Rose, 1997).
A unifying characteristic of both the Soviet and the post-Soviet era is an
absence of trust in the workings of society. Numerous studies have shown
that physical and psychological well-being are directly related to the levels
of inequality in a society, rather than absolute poverty (Wilkinson, 1996).
And social inequality is in turn related to the levels of connectedness and
trust between people (House et al., 1988; Berkman, 1995; Seeman, 1996;
Putnam, 2000). However, the absence of trust has had different mental
health manifestations in the Soviet and the post-Soviet era.
Fieldwork background
My own work has been carried out in Latvia over the past 12 years. It has
involved talking with people who described themselves as psychologically
damaged and who may or may not have sought medical help for their
condition (Skultans, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1998, 1999). It involved
talking to doctors and psychiatrists and, more recently, it has involved sitting
in on psychiatric consultations as a semi-participant observer (Skultans,
2003). Throughout my periods of fieldwork and in the transcription and
interpretation of interviews I have been uneasily aware of the ways in which
my work has fallen short of the formal guidelines suggested for ethical
anthropological practice. But had I followed the guidelines in a strict sense,
my fieldwork could not have been carried out.
My article is based upon 12 months of fieldwork carried out in Latvia
between 1991 and 1992, and seven months during 2001. During the first
period of fieldwork I talked with more than a hundred people who
considered their health, in particular their nervous health, to be damaged.
In 2001 I spoke with psychiatrists and their patients. I was allowed to sit in
on some 300 psychiatric consultations and to tape-record these consulta-
tions. Without a doubt, the location and focus of my research, particularly
in 2001, brought the traditional ethical problems of transparency and
informed consent to a particularly sharp edge. However, over and above
these traditional concerns was an acute moral discomfiture that some
psychiatrists were promoting an account of patients’ distress that was totally
at odds with the patients’ views of what was wrong and why and, indeed,
with my own perceptions.
Skultans: Varieties of Deception and Distrust
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Negotiating ‘consent’ and fudging transparency
Negotiating consent to carry out an ethnography of psychiatric consulta-
tions reveals the unequal distribution of power between psychiatrists and
their patients. The difficult part was gaining permission from psychiatrists
to sit in on and record their consultations. Thereafter, the patient’s consent
appeared to be part and parcel of agreeing to the consultation as such.
Patients were asked something along the lines of, ‘You don’t mind if the
anthropologist from England listens to our conversation?’ or ‘You don’t
mind if the professor from England sits in on the consultation, do you?’ No
patient refused permission for me to listen. Of the ten psychiatrists whom
I approached, two refused collaboration. The other eight showed an extra-
ordinary degree of tolerance and generosity in overcoming distrust of my
presence, fear of how I might judge their professional competence and the
uses to which I might put the recordings. Their friendly generosity has
placed me in a moral quandary. How can I square the hospitality and co-
operation offered me by Latvian psychiatrists with my sometimes critical
stance of their ideas and practice? The result is that I feel rather like a guest
who eats a meal only to speak badly of the host’s cooking skills afterwards.
I am not sure how to resolve this unease, save to say that ethical obligations
form a hierarchical structure. Taken singly, each has weight but taken
together some override others.
Understanding other cultures on their own terms requires a certain
suspension of judgement. And yet recent developments in epistemological
theory have highlighted the naivety and unattainability of aspirations
towards ethical neutrality. How to find a middle way between openness to
cultural difference and ethical indifference is an ongoing problem in ethno-
graphic research. The emphasis on transparency and openness in the
research situation influenced largely by feminist practice has been shown
to have major pitfalls of its own. Stacey has argued that it is precisely the
closeness engendered by feminist ethnographic practice that is responsible
for ‘inauthenticity, dissimilitude, and potential, perhaps inevitable, betrayal’
(1988: 22). Emotional connectedness and empathic understanding should
not disguise the fact that the ethnographer and informant have different
motivations in participating in the research. Glucksmann describes this as:
‘the different and unequal relation to knowledge of the researched and
researcher’ (1994: 159). Re-naming informants as respondents or partici-
pants does not empower them in any real sense. It may simply be a way of
‘attempting to establish an egalitarianism in the research situation as a
substitute for establishing it in the “real world”’ (Glucksmann, 1994: 151).
And, as Smith argues, obtaining approval for sociological texts is often not
real approval but a form of capitulation (Frank, 2001: 356).
The American Anthropological Association published a statement on
ethical practice that contained the following injunction: ‘In research,
anthropologists’ paramount responsibility is to those they study. When
health: 9(4)
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there is a conflict of interests these individuals must come first’ (1986: 2).
This statement poses special problems for the ethnographic study of psychi-
atric practice, which encompasses both psychiatrists and their patients.
While the statement recognizes the ‘plurality of values, interests and
demands’ in the societies studied by anthropologists, the study of psychi-
atric consultations often encapsulates a conflict of interests that are particu-
larly difficult to work with. Some of these misgivings may be resolved by
the directive ‘to contribute to an “adequate definition of reality” upon which
public opinion and public policy may be based’ (1986: 3). However, the
equivalent British statement of the Association of Social Anthropologists
is more cautious: ‘The advancement of knowledge and the pursuit of infor-
mation are not in themselves sufficient justifications for overriding the
values and ignoring the interests of those studied’ (ASA, 1999: 2).
Perhaps more than other areas of anthropological study cross-cultural
psychiatry is faced with the problem of how to adjudicate between compet-
ing definitions of reality and normality. Some years ago Kleinman (1977)
advocated a ‘new cross-cultural psychiatry’. His argument for the more
radical approach of cross-cultural psychiatry rested on epistemological
considerations to do with the social construction of knowledge. The impo-
sition of western psychiatric categories for understanding the behaviour of
people in other societies was, he argued, a form of psychiatric imperialism.
Each society has developed concepts for understanding disordered behav-
iour, and to impose western categories is to distort a reality that has already
been filtered through local concepts. It involves imposing second-order
categories on first-order categories and was, he argued, an illegitimate move.
These problems, which are a regular feature of ethnographic research,
appear in a more acute form in the anthropological study of mental illness
and its treatment. Disordered behaviour, which causes distress to the indi-
vidual and those around him/her, rules out moral indifference. Unequal
access to knowledge within a psychiatric consultation makes true equality
difficult and inequality may in any case be further ensconced by institutional
arrangements of inequality. A divergence between the individual’s experi-
ence and psychiatric theories may feed a conflict of interests. Competition
over the right to define reality acquires a new meaning in the triangulation
that takes place between the anthropologist, the psychiatrist and his/her
patients. And how does the demand for informed consent fit into the ethno-
graphic study of psychiatric practice? What counts as informed consent in
the context of a psychiatric consultation? Whose consent is required: the
patient’s, the psychiatrist’s or both? And, given the conflict of interests and
perspectives, is it realistic to expect such consent?
The ASA ethical guidelines describe informed consent as expressing ‘the
belief in the need for truthful and respectful exchanges between social
researchers and the people whom they study’ (1999: 3). And moreover, it
is not enough to be given consent once only. Consent ‘may require
renegotiation over time; it is an issue to which the anthropologist should
Skultans: Varieties of Deception and Distrust
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return periodically’ (1999: 3). In my case, consent to listen to and record
consultations was obtained from psychiatrists through informal discussion
who then asked for ‘consent’ from their patients at the beginning of the
consultation. Typically, this took the form of cursory questions already
alluded to. As I said earlier, permission was never withheld. Whether their
agreement constituted informed consent is another matter. But certainly
my presence in the consultations was not, I think, perceived as particularly
unusual.
This ready agreement within the context of a psychiatric consultation is
not only about informed consent. It concerns a clash of cultural and
professional expectations. Medical consultations in Soviet Latvia lacked the
privacy with which they are associated in the West. Access to consulting
rooms is seldom restricted to a doctor and her patient. Besides the prescrib-
ing nurse who shares the consulting room, other staff and, indeed, patients
frequently interrupt an ongoing consultation. Moreover, the ringing tele-
phone regularly intrudes with other patients’ problems as well as with the
doctor’s domestic troubles. Neither the boundaries of the patient’s nor the
doctor’s problems are guarded as rigorously as they are in western medical
practice. Patients were, until recently, in charge of their own notes. In such
contexts, problems are publicly shared. However, the idea of informed
consent only makes sense in the context of guarded boundaries and appro-
priated knowledge. To have pushed for more explicit consent would have
been to challenge and possibly undermine the existing understandings and
practices surrounding medical and psychiatric consultations in Latvia. Not
only might my motives have become suspect but also those of the psychi-
atrist. The emphasis on returning to the issue of informed consent and rene-
gotiating it suggests, in fact, that informants may wish to push the
anthropologist’s agenda out of their mind.
Changing conceptions of self under communism and
capitalism
Weber first alerted us to ‘the way in which “ideas” have, like switchmen,
determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic
of interest’ (1991: 280). But action is intrinsically connected to intention,
which in turn brings in the idea of agency. But agency is itself a slippery
term and means different things at different periods. Kemp has identified
five types of agency: moral, embodied, volitional, behavioural and social,
which may or may not co-exist (2004: 63). Under Soviet rule, agency for
many Latvians was confined to the moral sphere. It related to an indi-
vidual’s ability to take up a moral position despite an absence of behav-
ioural and social agency. Paradoxically, under economic liberalism, which
emphasizes the individual’s power to change his or her life circumstances,
there has been an erosion of moral agency. There has been an unquestion-
ing internalization of a liberal philosophy of the self. However, in the
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absence of behavioural and social agency this uncritical acceptance of an
ideologically enlarged conception of the self is a source of pain and discom-
fort to many. Thus the changes from a command to a market economy have
been accompanied by equally painful intra-psychic changes. I would like to
present images of social and psychological change by using excerpts from
my conversations with psychiatrists and patients over a 10-year span. My
excerpts come from my fieldwork in 1992 and 2001. They illustrate the way
in which both understandings of distress, the positioning of the individual
vis-à-vis society, the divergence between lay and professional understand-
ings of mental ill health and the sources of distrust and disconnectedness
have changed.
In 1992 I had many conversations with Anna, a psychiatrist. Initially I
was interested in her practice and her patients’ problems. However, as we
became friends the conversation shifted to her own life and the way in
which she felt the events in her life had damaged her health. Her own short-
hand term for her problems was summed up by the quasi-medical term
‘neurosis’. She attributed the condition to herself and claimed that it had
developed as a result of the particular course her life had taken and the
historical and social conditions in which it was embedded. However, in
making these claims and admissions, Anna was making a connection with
other Latvians.
For example, Anna says:
I don’t for one moment consider that I am the only one who hasn’t succeeded
or something like that. I have always told myself that I am not the only one like
that. The whole Latvian nation is like that. I think that every other family has
all sorts of problems. You could call it destiny, or the situation or this communist
epoch. I don’t know how to put it more precisely: there is nowhere where this
mystical epoch hasn’t interfered and hasn’t transformed life. My destiny isn’t
anything special. There are many more tragic destinies than mine.
Anna’s life history is almost a social history detailing as it does the problems
of returning from Siberia and subsequent problems with accommodation:
People were very intimidated here. They didn’t want to socialize freely. It was
difficult to find anywhere to live, although houses were empty. They didn’t let us
in. We lived with relatives for three or four months, then we found a little old
woman, she lived in a private house and she gave us a room.
Anna also relates her neurosis, as she terms it, to her subsequent diffi-
cult living circumstances. I asked her whether she had sought help for her
problems.
Well, I think I could be helped with the nerve illness. But I think that while the
cause has not been liquidated, the cause of my neurosis, the cause of my stress,
until I have peaceful home circumstances, at work I am tense, I have to listen to
different people, different complaints, different characters, I have to be calm all
the time, and when I go home I can’t rest and again I have to hear . . . to be
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specific I have to hear various swear words addressed to me. Actually, I don’t
get any rest anywhere.
But most of all I suffer from the fact that my children hear those rude Russian
swear words. I’m not so concerned about myself however unpleasant it may be
and the same goes for grandmother, but a child. Those children are growing up
the same way as me – neurotic. A new generation of neurotics, because they’re
already afraid. A young child doesn’t understand swear words. I remember that
my youngest daughter was five years old. She comes in and calls me swear words.
My daughter asks me what they mean. I have to tell her that those are bad words.
It hurts me especially for the children, that a new generation will also suffer from
accommodation neurosis.
The neurosis seems to have an existence that is almost independent of the
individual. Accommodation neurosis suggests that the neurosis resides
outside the individual. But at the same time Anna retains her ability and
right to pass judgement on her difficult circumstances even though she lacks
the ability to change her circumstances. Anna is typical of many doctors
who in 1992 were ready to be open about their problems and see their
source in the difficult circumstances through which they had lived and were
living. Although psychiatrists during the Soviet era were perceived as agents
of social control and, indeed, some were involved in medicalizing political
dissent, many others were ready to acknowledge the harsh impact of histori-
cal and social circumstances on individual well-being. The role of psychia-
trists in promoting a misrecognition of the noxious influence of certain
forms of social oppression has not been confined to the Soviet era.
Images of change in 2001 are drawn from 35 open-ended conversations
I conducted in the polyclinic of a provincial town in north Vidzeme. This
clinic had no psychotherapist or psychiatrist and for this reason the director
of the clinic was happy for me to see patients who wanted to talk about
their problems. I explained to the director that I was an anthropologist
interested in social change and its effect on self-concepts and discourses of
distress. A poster to that effect was put up in the clinic and a notice was
published in the local paper. However, it soon became clear that I was cast
in the role of a psychotherapist. One patient opened the interview by saying
that she had never consulted a psychotherapist but that she had seen
psychotherapists in action in American soaps. All 35 of the patients who
came to see me were women and all were struggling with extremely diffi-
cult financial and domestic circumstances. All the conversations were tape-
recorded.
A unifying characteristic of all the accounts is that, while patients
described their difficult circumstances and the impossibility of making ends
meet, all adopted a judgemental and even a punitive attitude towards them-
selves and what they perceived as an inability to control their painful
emotions and to cope. For example, Milda is a 46-year-old woman due to
have an operation for a pituitary tumour. She blames herself for her lack
of control: ‘The tears flow by themselves. Even if I don’t want it the tears
health: 9(4)
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flow. It’s some sort of weakness. It’s bad. Probably someone else could
control themselves but my tears just flow and flow. I don’t know.’
Nearly everyone used phrases to do with management, control, order and
cultivation. The inability to manage one’s finances is mirrored by an
inability to manage one’s self. As one 29-year-old woman said: ‘If there is
order around me, then I myself feel ordered.’
Aija is 47 years old and started the conversation as follows: ‘It all started
because my husband has a job where he is supposed to be paid but isn’t
paid.’ Aija herself cannot get a job because she has tiny stubs in place of
teeth: ‘I can’t get a job, for example, because I don’t have teeth. A paradox
so to speak. It’s a kind of joke.’ But it is a joke that makes her cry even as
she talks about it. And she condemns herself for crying: ‘I cry over nothing.
I always manage. I don’t know how to find a solution. There’s nothing to
cry about.’ Like many others, she manages in the sense of surviving and yet
does not manage in any decent and meaningful way. The difficult financial
situation creates a feeling of futility and purposelessness. A senior nurse at
the polyclinic described it thus: ‘All my life I’ve saved, all my life. But I’m
still short of money and short of money.’
The financial difficulties are accentuated in cases of illness. Forty-six-year-
old Biruta has an ailing 65-year-old mother and two boys who are studying
and not yet financially independent. This is how she describes the problem:
Father had a bigger pension. At that time there were two pensions. And one
pension could go [on] medicines. Then they could afford 20 lats and buy Cipramil,
for example. But now there is just one pension. And during the winter my
husband doesn’t have a proper job and I still have to support my children and
to pay the bills. I can’t take my mother to the doctor and get all her prescrip-
tions because mother’s pension just won’t cover them. She has heart, she has
liver, she has kidneys, she has legs, she has back. Well you understand, when you
have all the ailments, all the money goes on medicines. And now, for example,
when she gets her pension she will have just five lats in her purse.
The rhetorical detailing of ailments and precise sums of money serves to
bring home the impossibility of making the sums add up in a satisfactory
way. However, beyond the impossible sums and the paradox of not being
able to get a job without teeth or teeth without a job lies the shame that
such situations engender. The feelings of shame and self-blame are most
acutely conveyed in the anxieties aroused by the ceremonial functions of
school leaving. In Latvia, both during the Soviet era and continuing to the
present, school leaving was associated with a number of public occasions
demanding lavish expenditure on clothes for children and parents, flowers
and presents for teachers. Many women spoke of the nightmarish anticipa-
tion of these events; of not knowing how to find the necessary money and
yet being terrified of exposing the shame of their poverty to schoolmates,
other parents and neighbours.
These extracts demonstrate important differences in the articulation of
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distress between 1992 and 2001. In 1992, abnormality was perceived as an
attribute of social circumstances and their shaping of individual lives.
People described their abnormal life ‘sˇita¯ nenorma¯la¯ dzı¯ve’ as damaging
nerves ‘sadraga¯ nervus’ in a very concrete way. It is the individual’s life
experiences, rather than their personality, which is abnormal. The verb
‘sadraga¯t’ is primarily used to convey the infliction of physical damage as
in the case of using an insufficiently inflated car tyre or the scuffing of a
shoe by a careless child. The term brings to mind a careless and brutal
assault and its physical consequences. Here the explanations speak of the
contingency of existence and suggest a fine understanding of the historical
and social embedding of their lives. In 2001 the locus of responsibility for
distress has shifted. Although life now presents an equally difficult, though
different, set of circumstances, people do not judge their responses as inevi-
table and, therefore, in some sense appropriate. Instead, their distress is tied
up with feelings of shame and self-blame. Whereas Anna in 1992 connected
her feelings with those of others, Milda in 1992 distinguishes her responses
from those of others: ‘Probably someone else could control themselves.’
These changes have taken place independently of the intervention of
psychiatrists or psychotherapists, as my conversations in the polyclinic
indicate. My own understanding of the patients’ distress pointed to contra-
dictions between the new ideology of economic liberalism and the actual
opportunities that were available to people. Indeed, I felt it was right to
make my views known to patients if only to lessen the punitive burden of
self-blame. In articulating my own position, at odds with that of the
patients’, I was, I suppose, trying to give them a lost sense of community
and to relieve them of the burden of self-blame.
Changing psychiatric language
Psychiatry, as practised in Latvia, has until fairly recently been very much
in the Soviet mould. This has meant that the psychiatrist’s duty to the
patient has been counterbalanced by ‘the interests of society’ and ‘the prin-
ciples of communist morality’ (The Physician’s Oath of the Soviet Union
1971 in Bloch and Chodoff, 1984: 114). Certainly, the social and political
abuses of Soviet psychiatry have been widely publicized (Medvedev and
Medvedev, 1971; Bloch and Reddaway, 1977; Lader, 1977; Podrabinek,
1980). These writings have largely dealt with the diagnosis of ‘sluggish
schizophrenia’ and the ways in which it has been used to incarcerate and
silence political dissidents. The misuse of psychiatry for political ends led
to the expulsion of the Soviet Union from the World Psychiatric Associ-
ation in 1983. They were readmitted in 1989.
For these reasons, Soviet psychiatry has been held up as an extreme
example of the potential abuse of psychiatry for political ends. Soviet
psychiatry ‘demonstrates, with grim clarity, how a system that appears to
have only scientific origins and professional goals can, simply by virtue of
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its own nature as a systematic psychiatric technology, result in significant
human harm’ (Reich, 1991: 66). The development of Soviet psychiatry and,
in particular, the diagnosis of ‘sluggish schizophrenia’ illustrates the
dramatic ways in which psychiatric categories can come to influence the
perception of behaviour and, therefore, of course the experience of patients:
Those Soviet psychiatrists really saw the patients as schizophrenic; or, to put it
another way, the system created a category, first on paper and then, with training,
in the minds of Soviet psychiatrists, which was eventually assumed to represent
a real class of patients and which was inevitably filled by real persons. (Reich,
1991: 71)
However, in the process of identifying the misuses of Soviet psychiatry,
the everyday practice of psychiatry has been neglected and the ethical
dilemmas encountered in all psychiatric practice have been glossed over.
I would argue that it is precisely the ubiquity of certain psychiatric
conditions such as neurasthenia that rendered them invisible. Conversa-
tions with Dr Alka, the principal doctor at the headquarters of the Riga
emergency ambulance service, suggested that the majority of Latvians
suffered from damaged nerves in some form or other. In people under 35
years of age this manifested itself as a dysthesia of the autonomic nervous
system, in Latvian vegetativa¯ distonija. The Chambers dictionary defines
dysthesia as ‘a morbid habit of body, resulting in general discomfort or
impatience’. Dr Alka listed chest pains, headaches, sudden changes in
blood pressure as symptoms of vegetativa¯ distonija. In patients over 35
the diagnosis was neurasthenia, suggestive of a more entrenched condition
that had moved beyond mere habit but was associated with similar
symptoms. Dr Alka referred to the difficulty of distinguishing between
functional and organic conditions: ‘Well, you see, we are afraid of over-
looking organic illnesses. Because in principle almost every person has
these neurasthenia problems. Those or some others, because all these social
things leave a very heavy imprint on a person.’ Thus Latvian psychiatry
embodied a paradox. On the one hand, it had assimilated a Pavlovian
theory of character types, which accounted for a variety of weaknesses of
the nervous system. Underpinning this categorization was a dualistic
theory that divided people into social and egoistic types (Skultans, 1997a:
9). But on the other hand, these diagnostic categories have a semantic
complexity that included a critique of society. People, including doctors,
described the dishonesty and disorder of society eroding their health in a
very direct and brutal fashion.
Independence and westernization have brought with them many changes
in psychiatric theory and practice not easy to describe under a single rubric.
Two new helping professions have appeared, namely, psychotherapists and
psychologists. Experts from the Scandinavian countries, France, Germany
and the United Kingdom travel regularly to Riga to give seminars and
training courses. Considerable diversity has thus been introduced into
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psychotherapeutic practice. However, countering these centrifugal tenden-
cies is the centripetal effect of the translation of the International Classifi-
cation of Diseases into Latvian. Whereas earlier versions of the ICD were
adapted to local circumstances, the ICD 10 aims to be an exact translation.
The large section on Disorders of the Autonomic Nervous System has disap-
peared. In their place have appeared psychoneurotic disorders such as
depression, anxiety and acute panic disorder. The very active presence of
two pharmaceutical companies, namely, Solvay Pharma and Lundbeck, has
also played a large part in shaping psychiatric treatment and theory. The
monthly day conferences organized by pharmaceutical companies are well
attended by provincial family doctors and psychiatrists. The diagnosis and
discussion of disorders such as depression are linked to new possibilities of
treatment. In some ways the sudden influx of a variety of drug treatments
has become an iconic representation of the new market economy, which in
theory is open to all but in practice is beyond the reach of most.
In practice these diagnostic changes have led to changes that involve a
fragmentation of feelings and their decontextualization. By and large,
psychiatrists are interested in the intensity and duration of feelings and
their response to medication but not the circumstances that give rise to
these feelings. This means that feelings are stripped of their narrative struc-
ture and come to be seen as quasi-physical objects rather than socially
embedded feelings. The novelist/philosopher Robert Musil captures this
way of viewing human experience in his novel The man without qualities:
Who has not noticed how independent experiences have made themselves of
humans? They have gone on the stage, into books, into the reports of scientific
institutions and expeditions, into communities based on religious or other beliefs,
which cultivate certain kinds of experience rather than others, as a kind of social
experiment, and insofar as experiences are not merely found in work, they are
simply in the air . . . There has arisen a world of qualities without a man to them,
of experiences without anyone to experience them, and it almost looks as though,
in the ideal case, people would no longer experience anything privately at all,
and the comforting weight of personal responsibility would dissolve into a system
of formulae for potential meanings. (1997: 158)
Divergence in conceptual understandings and the implications
for meaning loss
The fit between clinical concepts of disease and lay concepts of illness is
never perfect. Theories of disease involve generalization and aim to identify
patients as instances of a particular disease. Illness focuses on the particu-
larity, the non-repeatability and life-threatening quality of suffering. Illness
is a prime example of the vulnerability and non-repeatability of human
projects and the elusiveness of our aspirations for control (Nussbaum, 2001:
42). However, there must be some degree of overlap for understanding and
dialogue to take place. I would argue that during the era of Soviet
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psychiatry there was a divergence between professional and lay uses of
language but that this served to disguise an underlying agreement in
meaning and a fundamental solidarity between psychiatrist and patient.
Doctors like Anna and Dr Alka were ready to admit that they themselves
might suffer from neurasthenia. Although the psychological language of
depression might prima facie suggest the possibility of convergence, in fact,
it has served to exacerbate differences between people by linking
depression with vulnerable personalities. Dr Helga expresses this differ-
ence by saying: ‘For the patient the doctor is more powerful. Because he
is a more powerful personality and more unified. And that is more healthy
for the patient. Because the process of re-constructing is quicker.’ The new
psychiatric language, rather than promoting empathy and the recognition
of suffering, has created hierarchical boundaries and a widening gap
between local and extra-local meanings.
Lack of consensus and dialogue compounds pain and creates confusion.
The following excerpts from a consultation between Valerijs, a middle-aged
man diagnosed as having depression, and the psychiatrist Dr Helga, illus-
trate the way in which the diagnosis of depression serves to deny suffering
and promotes non-communication. The patient’s suffering has a narrative
structure intimately linked to the chronological unfolding and contingen-
cies of his work situation. The psychiatrist, however, introduces a medical
discourse of ‘insufficiency’ that explicitly excludes the patient’s concerns.
Patient: Fundamentally I had problems with work. Ours is a changeable
situation. At the moment, for example . . . It’s very interesting that last
year I came because of problems at work and as a result depression
set in, nothing interests me and it’s difficult to get involved in anything.
And now after a year I have exactly the same situation, except that
the firm where I worked . . . Well, they just made me redundant without
a reason. I asked them, ‘What’s the reason?’ There’s no reason. I’ve
got no protection. At present the social security systems are insuffi-
ciently developed. A person is very vulnerable.
Interestingly, the patient uses the same term ‘insufficiency’ that the doctor
later uses to describe his brain. There follows a conversational exchange in
which there is a considerable amount of agreement and support for the
patient partly because of my own interventions and sympathy for the
patient’s plight. The worthlessness of contracts and absence of employees’
safeguards is discussed. However, when the consultation moves on to
address issues of health the polyphonic and dialogic quality disappear and
the psychiatrist begins to assert her clinical authority. Ironically it is I who
move the conversation on to the subject of health.
VS: And how is your health?
Patient: My health . . . thank God. Well, it depends in what sense. I suppose in
one sense it’s good and in another sense it’s so . . . Well thanks to the
medication, of course, it’s good. I’d stopped. I told you I’d stopped
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taking the medicines. It must have been about a week. And then I felt
straight away that dark thoughts started to crowd in upon me. I started
to feel bad. I didn’t think that would happen because I thought am I
going to be dependent on medicines forever.
The patient’s uncertainty and hesitation over what is wrong, why things are
wrong and how to put them right emerge at this point. It is clear that there
is a fundamental disagreement between the patient’s and the psychiatrist’s
views of the problem. Valerijs is concerned about dependency and recover-
ing a sense of his own agency, whereas the psychiatrist seems to have in
mind an explanatory model based on constitutional deficiency.
Doctor: That’s not dependency, Valerij. That’s not dependency.
Patient: Yes, but I am dependent right now.
Doctor: No, it’s not dependency but insufficiency. It’s insufficiency. In the same
way that, for example, you can have cardiac insufficiency, or lung insuf-
ficiency or liver insufficiency, so you can have insufficiency of the brain
synapses. Or more accurately the mediators of the synapses.
Patient: But is it temporary?
Doctor: It is temporary. No, rather it can be compensated for. Temporary is
perhaps not the correct description; it is compensatory.
Patient: Does that mean that I shall never be the same as I once was?
The directness of Valerij’s question conveys both poetry and anguish and
is in stark contrast to the psychiatrist’s obfuscating and dilatory replies. She
does not attempt to answer his question but instead pursues a pseudo-
scientific theory.
Doctor: Why do you say that? If it is compensatory then you can compensate
for the condition. It can be improved and maintained. But it needs
long-term . . . well it needs a long-term foundation, so to speak. Well,
just as for any insufficiency. Because that’s how it is in fact. And that’s
what we spoke about earlier – why these disturbances recur. Because
these are micro-organic disturbances. And as we know – the organic
does not get better by itself. It returns and it can only be compensated
for. That’s why I compare it to weakness and insufficiency. It’s to do
with the mediators of the synapses.
Patient: But if all the circumstances were very favourable, then perhaps one
could recover?
Doctor: Yes, but you need compensation.
In this sequence the psychiatrist defines the terms of the discussion. She
introduces the idea of ‘the return of the organic’ representing the patient
as its harbinger. The patient’s anxious questions about dependency on medi-
cation suggest that for him the psychiatrist’s theories about compensation
for insufficiency carry little weight. Certainly, the questions are not
addressed and issues of dependency are redefined as an organic defect.
Again the essence of the patient’s emotive plea: ‘Does that mean I shall
never be as I once was?’ is left unanswered. The question is about the
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patient’s sense of himself, and the convoluted answer in terms of brain
synapses does not address the patient’s anxieties. However, the patient does
not give up and tries to relate his problems to the social circumstances of
his work thereby implying that recovery might just be possible. The inter-
change between patient and psychiatrist illustrates the moral implications
of mind/body problems. As Toulmin argues: ‘Far from being purely theor-
etical questions about how we can distinguish psychological explanations
from physiological ones, the issues now become intensely practical ones,
about how we are to treat people at the crucial moments of their lives’
(1988: 344). Toulmin is discussing medical technology and dying patients
but his point applies with equal force to patients consulting a psychiatrist.
Patient: Well, for example, what do favourable circumstances mean? Literally
one month ago favourable circumstances started to develop when I
achieved a more or less normal financial situation – well, according to
today’s standards anyway. I sat down with my wife and we sorted our
budget out. We knew we could cover this and this and this. And that
went on for a week and I was in a very good mood and I was already
starting to plan. I started to think about tomorrow. And Monday I
arrived at work and I had totally unexpected news – I was told I had
to look for other work. And immediately I stopped thinking about
tomorrow. So about tomorrow . . . I just have today. I no longer have
a tomorrow. So to speak.
Doctor: Well, that’s quite right.
Patient: In the stress situation I was in I felt . . .
Doctor: Yes, quite right.
The doctor’s replies are perfunctory. Indeed, as the patient tries to elabo-
rate on his feelings she cuts him short. The patient then offers a symptom
that the doctor may be more ready to respond to: ‘My only complaint is
that I’m terribly sleepy.’ At this point in the consultation the doctor at once
becomes more alert and shows interest. However, when the patient voices
the suspicion that his tiredness may be due to diabetes and that he should
consult a different kind of specialist the psychiatrist bluntly contradicts him:
‘That’s not diabetes. That’s hypochondria.’ The psychiatrist then switches
tack and seems to undermine her own previous model of disease.
Doctor: Well you see . . . You must understand that you shouldn’t put demands
on yourself. Otherwise you won’t be able to start your internal motor.
You can’t buy strength in a shop. Unfortunately, even though many
would like to. Surprisingly, many people want to.
The patient’s reply suggests that he has more insight into the implications
of the doctor’s approach than she does herself: ‘Well, maybe if we develop
in the capitalist direction, then we’ll be able to buy strength.’
After discussing the combinations and strengths of his various medica-
tions the doctor emphasizes the importance of rest for restoring the
patient’s strength. Surprisingly in view of the fact that much of the
Skultans: Varieties of Deception and Distrust
507
05_skultans_056415 (jk-t)  19/8/05  1:32 pm  Page 507
discussion has been about purchasing medication to compensate for
nervous insufficiency, she tells the patient that he cannot buy strength.
Clearly the patient, although not the psychiatrist, is unaware of the negative
connotations of the term ‘hypochondria’. When the patient makes a
tentative suggestion that extends beyond the limits of the psychiatrist’s
professional competence, namely, that perhaps his problems fall within the
area of another medical speciality such as endocrinology, the psychiatrist
quickly abandons the organic model. Instead the pejorative term ‘hypo-
chondria’ is introduced which questions character and motives. Finally, the
consultation is wrapped up by looking through the prescriptions. The
psychiatrist effects closure by saying, ‘If there is anything, let me know. If
anything is unclear? Yes?’ Much in the consultation has been left unclear
and created bewilderment in the patient but clarity is confined to timing
and dosage of medication.
Throughout the consultation the doctor skilfully directs the conversation
away from the social polyphony of his life to something narrower and more
tangible, thereby asserting her clinical authority. Only when her authority
is challenged does the organic model flounder. However, no real dialogue
develops between this patient and the psychiatrist. The voices of the patient
and psychiatrist extend in parallel without meeting. The patient’s account
encompasses both an interpretation of the social forces that give his suffer-
ing its particular shape and the existential anguish to which they give rise.
He knows, for example, that, ‘The market does not work in my favour’. As a
consequence he describes his existential dilemma as having ‘no tomorrow’.
Discussion
So what do these voices from a psychiatrist’s consulting room tell us about
ethics? And how do they relate to my earlier discussion of self-understand-
ing, psychiatric language and divergences of meaning? Latvian psychiatrists,
like their colleagues elsewhere, have humanitarian and pragmatic goals,
which are to do with reducing painful feelings and making life more toler-
able for their patients. In order to put these goals into practice they focus
on the efficacy of diagnoses and medications. However, my observation of
consultations and the broader existential issues that these raise suggest that
an exclusive focus on painful feelings and their alleviation is counter-
productive and, indeed, increases suffering. The decontextualization and
denarrativization of emotion are a powerful assault on the patient’s search
for meaning. They constitute a refusal to engage with the patient as a moral
agent. By contrast, as an anthropologist my interests in the psychiatrist’s
habitual ways of dealing with patients and their responses, was not primarily
to do with efficacy, but rather with the social forces that shape the under-
standing and practice of both. In having this broader social agenda I would
like to think I was closer to acknowledging the suffering of the patient.
A number of colleagues have rightly pointed out that in all societies
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misunderstandings between doctors and their patients are common and
between psychiatrists and their patients they are very common. So in what
ways does my ethnography illustrate problems that are specific to Latvia? I
would answer that the speed of political and economic change has put special
pressures on psychiatry as one of the institutions responsible for transform-
ing conceptions of the self and its ills. Psychiatrists have often unwittingly
acted as agents of a total institution that has stripped people of their earlier
identities and reconstituted them in its preferred image. The ‘environmental
niche’ that allowed conceptions of illness as normal and as part and parcel
of a collective identity has disappeared. For Latvians, normality was else-
where, most probably in Western Europe. But now that Latvia is in Europe,
normality has arrived and with it the need to draw sharp lines between those
who achieve and those who fail to achieve normality. The mercurial quality
of this social situation highlights the inadequacy of traditional ethical theo-
rizing and suggests instead that only a finely tuned ethnography can access
the painful particularity of individual predicaments.
So where does this leave transparency within the research relationship?
Transparency implies a certain congruence of perspective. But it may be
that certain intellectual perspectives are, by their very nature, incongruent.
Perhaps, therefore, anthropology is destined to remain opaque from the
perspective of certain kinds of psychiatric practice. Notwithstanding the
claims of hybrids such as Devereux (1978, 1980), medical anthropology is,
after all, in the business of destabilizing, if not dissolving, psychiatric
categories – the very tools of the psychiatrist’s trade. The psychiatrist’s prag-
matic goals make them less aware of their own theoretical assumptions.
The insistence on transparency, given the divergence of interests, might
constitute an obstacle to getting on with the business of the consultation.
Does this mean that anthropological fieldwork necessarily involves betrayal
and if so how can it be justified? Was I listening to the misery of others
with a view to gaining more publications and furthering my own career?
Stacey reveals her ambivalent position over an informant’s death provid-
ing her, as it does, with rich fieldwork opportunities (1988: 23). I suppose
to be honest I would have to recognize that one’s motives are always a
varying mixture of the personal and the altruistic and that it is their combi-
nation that matters particularly as it affects the practice of ethnography at
particular moments. If at the most painful culmination of a patient’s story
my concern is for my tape-recorder rather than the patient, then there is
clearly something wrong with the combination. These are the dilemmas of
witnessing that Behar attempts to identify (1996). She writes:
In the midst of a massacre, in the face of torture, in the eye of a hurricane, in
the aftermath of an earthquake, or even, say, when horror looms apparently more
gently, in memories that won’t recede and so come pouring forth in the late-
night quiet of a kitchen, as a storyteller opens her heart to a story listener,
recounting hurts that cut deep and raw into the gullies of the self, do you, the
observer, stay behind the lens of the camera, switch on the tape-recorder, keep
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pen in hand? Are there limits – of respect, piety, pathos – that should not be
crossed, even to leave a record? (1996: 2)
Her way of resolving such dilemmas is not to separate the ethnographic
voice from the personal and emotional voice, but to write personally and
vulnerably (1996: 17). How one puts this into practice is another matter,
for there is no single model to follow. And yet I hope that an anthropolog-
ical perspective, which includes the voices of both patients and psychiatrists
and is both personal and critical, may make a longer-term contribution to
psychiatric practice and the well-being of patients.
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